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MINIMUM DISTRIBUTIONS OF CONTROLLED FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS UNDER SECTION 963 OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
INTRODUCTION
Pre-1962 developments: tax deferral and the rise of tax havens
In the fifty-three years between 1909 and 1962, little change
was made in the fundamental jurisdictional criteria for the taxation
of the income of foreign corporations. Until 1962, it was generally
true that a domestic corporation was taxed on a global or world-
wide basis. Foreign corporations were taxed on income from "busi-
ness transacted and capital invested within the United States."'
Under this jurisdictional pattern there was a significant differ-
ence in the tax treatment of the foreign branch of a United States
enterprise and that of a foreign corporation owned or controlled
by United States interests. A foreign branch of a United States
enterprise was treated as a mere arm of the United States entity
and its income was included in the income of the United States
branch of the business. United States income taxes would be due
on such income in the year of receipt.2 On the other hand, a foreign
corporation owned or controlled by United States interests, though
analogous in function to a foreign branch, was treated like any other
foreign corporation: It was taxed only on income derived from
sources within the United States.3 If the foreign corporation had no
income derived from United States operations, it would pay no
1 36 Stat. 113 (1909).
2 By the same token, any losses encountered by the foreign branch could be used
to offset gains realized by the United States branch of the enterprise. Thus, if losses
were anticipated in the initial years of foreign operations, a branch was often advis-
able for those years. Furthermore, such advantages as percentage depletion deductions,
last-in-first-out inventory accounting methods, and accelerated depreciation were
available for a branch operation. Brudno, "The Practical Aspects of Incorporating
and Doing Business Abroad," U. So. Cal. 1959 Tax Inst. 345; Gilpin, "Form
of Organization for Service and Contract Agencies Engaged in Operations Abroad,"
in Taxation and Operations Abroad 33, 35-37 (1960); Gilpin & Kern, "U.S. Tax
Considerations Affecting Major Alternatives of Conducting Foreign Operations" in
2 Doing Business Abroad 470, 471 (1962).
3 Several attempts were made to give special treatment to foreign corporations
controlled by United States interests in order to reduce the impact of a combination
of foreign and United States taxes on these entities. Except for the foreign tax credit
adopted in 1918 and the Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation provisions adopted
in 1942, these attempts were either unsuccessful or insubstantial. Krause & Dam,
Federal Tax Treatment of Foreign Income 27-29 (1964).
COMMENT
United States income tax until its foreign income was returned to
the United States in the form of dividends, interest, or the proceeds
of a sale.4 This difference in tax treatment was unimportant before
1940 when the United States corporate tax rates were relatively low.
Then, a United States entity contemplating foreign operations was
normally more concerned with the foreign tax rate than the United
States rate since the United States tax would probably be offset by
the tax credit.5 However, when United States tax rates approached
or exceeded the foreign tax rates, the difference in treatment became
significant. A United States corporation could obtain substantial
tax advantages by conducting its foreign operations through a for-
eign corporation rather than through a foreign branch. United States
income taxes on the earnings of a foreign subsidiary could be effec-
tively deferred by not distributing earnings. Rather than return
these earnings to the United States and subject them to United
States taxes, management often decided to retain or reinvest them
abroad, resulting in a permanent deferral of the United States tax.
This tax deferral allowed a foreign subsidiary to acquire and accu-
mulate capital at a more rapid rate than a foreign branch or a
domestic corporation, with no risk of violating the accumulated
earnings tax provisions being encountered.
Maximum tax benefits could often be achieved by taking advan-
tage of a foreign tax haven. A tax haven is a country which imposes
little or no income tax on a corporation's earnings outside the
country of incorporation nor on the remittance of profits to the
parent company as dividends.' A United States corporation could
establish a subsidiary, called a base corporation, in such a haven,
and carry on its foreign operations in other foreign countries. The
profits from these operations would then be funneled into the base
company by means of intercompany pricing arrangements and by
shifting management fees and other corporate expenses. 7 "The
object was to have as much profit as possible... fall into the foreign
4 Gilpin, supra note 2, at 39-43.
G Moyer, "Operating a Corporate Enterprise Abroad," 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 271, 277.
6 Gilpin, supra note 2, at 45.
7 For a further discussion of methods and advantages of operating through a
base company, see Gibbons, Tax Factors in Basing International Business Abroad
4-37 (1957) ; Krause & Dam, op. cit. supra note 3, at 13-19; Baker, "Methods and
Channels of Foreign Trade," 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 142, 144-52; Brudno, supra note 2;
Cherryman, "The New 'Subpart F' Foreign Income Provisions of the Internal Rev-
enue Code" 4 W.&M. L. Rev. 172, 173 (1963); Gilpin, supra note 2, at 39-43; Gilpin
& Kern, "Foreign Base Corporations-Their Use and Selection," in 2 Doing Business
Abroad 533 (1962); Gooder & Wimmer, "Taxation Advantages and Problems in
Foreign Trade," 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 202, 207-10; Gordon, "Some Aspects of United States
Policy in the Taxation of Foreign Income," 1959 U. Il. L.F. 222; Moyer, supra note
5, at 273-74.
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base company ... ." 8 Such profit could then be reinvested abroad
in new operations, retained in the business, or allocated as needed
among the various existing foreign operations without being passed
through the United States parent or being subjected to the United
States tax.9
This . [enabled] the ... base corporation to operate simulta-
neously in several countries where tax rates at varying levels may
be imposed and to minimize the effect of the per country limitation
upon utilization of the foreign tax credit when dividends are paid
to the parent and taxed in the United States. 10
With these advantages available to a foreign subsidiary, but not to
a foreign branch, it is not surprising that tax considerations were
of paramount importance to the United States corporations or indi-
viduals planning to engage in foreign operations. In determining
the form of business entity to be used abroad, tax considerations
were often dispositive. The possibility of tax deferral often tipped
the scale in favor of the foreign subsidiary as opposed to the foreign
branch or direct exportation. The additional benefits of utilizing
the tax haven device made it immensely popular among organiza-
tional planners.1 By locating a base company in a country such
s Harris, "Foreign Base Companies Under the 1962 Act; Relief Provisions and
Areas for Tax Planning," U. So. Cal. 1964 Tax Inst. 287, 288.
9 Thus, in the period following World War II, there was a rapid increase in
foreign investment. In the highly industrialized countries in which there had been
substantial investment prior to World War II this increase was financed largely by
earnings retained by the foreign corporations or from the local borrowings of foreign
subsidiaries, rather than from a direct capital outflow from the United States. Moyer,
supra note 5, at 277.
10 Gilpin, supra note 2, at 45-46. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 904(a) (1), limits the
credit for foreign taxes paid. The credit may be as to total tax liability proportionately
no greater than the proportion which foreign source income bears to the taxpayer's
entire taxable income. If a corporation's foreign source income is one-third of its
total taxable income, the foreign tax credit available is limited to one-third of the
United States income tax due. Treas. Reg. § 1.904-1(a) (1957) as amended, T.D.
6789, 1965 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 6, at 7. Cf. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.904-1 (a) (1), 29
Fed. Reg. 7680-81 (1964). Under this section the foreign tax credit allowed may be
considerably less than the foreign tax actually paid. Use of a base company may
soften the impact of this provision. If the base company's income is composed of
income from a corporation located in a country with a relatively high income tax rate
and income from a corporation located in a country with a relatively low income tax
rate, the combination of the foreign taxes paid by the base company in these two
countries results in "an averaging process which usually reduces the adverse effect of
the per country limitation otherwise operative." Gilpin, supra at 46. See also Gilpin
& Kern, supra note 7, at 534-36.
11 As pointed out in a symposium conducted by the Tax Institute in December
of 1960, "there is relatively little ... difference in the way a business is run-
whether as a branch or as a subsidiary.. . . [S]ince the other costs are not affected
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as Switzerland or Lichtenstein, a United States corporation could
conduct extensive foreign operations with little or no tax expense.
THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON
THE TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN-SOURCE CORPORATE INCOME
Policy considerations underlying the Kennedy recommendations
Tax deferral undermines the maintenance of tax neutrality.
There are two aspects to the concept of tax neutrality: domestic
(export) neutrality and foreign (import) neutrality.
"Domestic neutrality implies equal treatment of Americans in-
vesting at home and Americans investing abroad." 12 When domes-
tic neutrality is achieved the tax on the investment return is the
same whether the income is derived from foreign or domestic
sources. "As a result, the investor's choice between foreign and
domestic investment will be free of tax considerations, as will his
choice of alternative foreign investments." 13 As the preceding indi-
cates, the prospect of tax deferral has a profound effect on both
these choices. It places a premium on foreign investment as opposed
to domestic investment, and the lure of the tax haven will effect the
investor's choice of alternative foreign investments.
"Foreign neutrality implies equal treatment of Americans in-
vesting in foreign operations and their non-American competi-
tors." 14 If foreign neutrality is achieved a United States citizen
investing abroad will be able to compete on equal terms with other
investors in the country where the investment is made. Barring
special international agreements, the United States can afford
foreign neutrality to United States taxpayers only by foregoing
taxation of foreign-source income."3 This would, in turn, frustrate
the policy of assessing tax liability according to the taxpayer's
ability to pay.
The two aspects of tax neutrality are mutually incompatible.
If foreign neutrality is achieved, domestic neutrality is impossible.
and since the markets are not affected, a little difference in tax may have a big effect
on the decision as to which type of arrangement to use." Blough, "General Analyse&
of Issues Facing Management," in Taxation and Operations Abroad 73, 78 (1960).
12 Krause & Dam, op. cit. supra note 3, at 45; See Musgrave, "Criteria for-
Foreign Tax Credit," in Taxation and Operations Abroad 83, 84-85 (1960).
13 Musgrave, supra note 12, at 84.
14 Krause & Dam, op. cit. supra note 3, at 45. See Musgrave, supra note 12,
at 85-86.
15 Even this would only be true where the income of other foreign investors in
the country of operations is tax exempt in their home country. To achieve complete
foreign neutrality, the tax structure of the country of incorporation of every foreign
corporation operating in the country of operations would have to be considered.
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Tax deferral creates incentive for private foreign investment
which may promote or subvert national policy goals. For example,
in the period immediately following World War II, major United
States foreign policy goals included the rebuilding of a war-tom
and demoralized Europe. Private foreign investment was encour-
aged to accomplish this result, and, to the extent tax deferral pro-
vided an incentive for such investment, it augmented United States
foreign policy. Today, foreign investment in underdeveloped coun-
tries may accelerate their economic development and promote poli-
tical stability. Since this is also an avowed aim of United States
policy, to the extent that tax deferral encourages investment in
underdeveloped countries, it serves foreign policy.
When foreign investment is made in a country which is eco-
nomically developed, no apparent foreign policy goal is furthered
by the availability of tax deferral. In fact, to the extent that tax
deferral encourages foreign investment which might otherwise be
made domestically or encourages retention of foreign earnings
abroad which might otherwise be repatriated, it may be detrimental
to the domestic economy and the balance of payments.
During the post-World War II period when the United States
was exporting huge amounts of capital to aid in the reconstruction
of Europe, a favorable balance of payments was built up. Since
the reconstruction of the European economy, and particularly with
the advent of the European Common Market, the United States'
export-import ratio has been declining until, as recent developments
have dramatically illustrated, the current position of the United
States balance of payments is cause for concern. In addition, as the
demands of a continually increasing domestic population create
further drains on United States resources, the United States is
forced to rely more heavily on the importation of raw materials.18
The necessity of expanding our exports to pay for increased
imports of raw materials may be as important to our national
welfare as expanding the domestic market. Otherwise, we shall
have to buy gold or further increase the already large dollar
claims that the rest of the world has against this country.17
The three primary sources of capital outflow are expenditures
for defense, foreign aid, and private foreign investments. "If . . .
annual outflows for defense and aid are permanent, then our only
refuge is to encourage exports. We have no other way of earning
the money with which to pay for the indispensable imports." 18
16 Baker, "Tax and Management Decisions and Form of Business for Export-
ing," in Taxation and Operations Abroad 3, 5-11 (1960).
17 Id. at 9.
18 Id. at 11.
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To the extent that tax deferral encourages private foreign in-
vestment and deters direct exportation, its effect on the balance of
payments can be detrimental, especially if the return on the foreign
investment is retained abroad. In this situation there is no subse-
quent capital inflow to offset the initial capital outflow created by
the investment.
The Kennedy Administration's recommendations
On April 20, 1961, President Kennedy presented in a message
to Congress his administration's tax recommendations for that
year.'9 In referring to the policies underlying these recommenda-
tions, the President's message said:
Changing economic conditions at home and abroad, the desire
to achieve greater equity in taxation, and the strains which have
developed in our balance of payments position in the last few
years, compel us to examine critically certain features of our
tax system which, in conjunction with the tax systems of other
countries consistently favor U.S. private investment abroad com-
pared with investment in our own economy.20
In developing these recommendations the Administration con-
sidered several different objectives and goals. Since some of these
objectives were in direct opposition to others, the proposals often
pulled in different directions. For example, the Administration felt
that tax considerations should play no part in determining the form
of doing business abroad. Realizing the impossibility of achieving
both foreign and domestic neutrality simultaneously and the unde-
sirability of achieving foreign neutrality, the Administration took
the position that the desirable goal was domestic neutrality.21
Furthermore, tax deferral was felt to have a deleterious effect on the
balance of payments due to the incentive it created for private
19 Message of the President of the United States, Hearings Before the House
Committee on Ways and Means on the President's 1961 Recommendations for Tax
Revision, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 1, at 3 (1961) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
Hearings].
20 H.R. Hearings, vol. 1, at 8.
21 Either we tax foreign income of U.S. companies at U.S. tax rates
and credit the income taxes paid abroad, thereby eliminating the tax factor
in the U.S. investor's choice between domestic and foreign investment; or
we permit foreign investors to be taxed at the rates applicable abroad,
thereby removing the impact, if any, which tax rate differences may have
on the competitive position of the American investor abroad. Both types of
neutrality cannot be achieved at once. I believe that reasons of tax equity
as well as reasons of economic policy clearly indicate that in the case of
investment in other industrialized countries we should give priority to tax
neutrality in the choice between investment here and investment abroad.
Statement of C. Douglas Dillon before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
H.R. Hearings, vol. 1, at 34.
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foreign investment. The Administration's conclusion was that the
elimination of tax deferral would help to achieve domestic neutral-
ity and, to the extent that it discouraged foreign investment, would
improve the balance-of-payments position.22 Accordingly, among
the 1961 recommendations was a proposal to eliminate tax deferral
by imposing an immediate tax on the profits of foreign corporations
controlled by United States interests, even if these profits remained
undistributed.23
On the other hand, presumably due to the administrative prob-
lems that would be created in the case of publicly-held foreign cor-
porations, the Administration felt that the elimination of tax defer-
ral should not be applied to every United States shareholder of
such corporations. Rather, it would apply only to those sharehold-
ers holding a substantial interest in a foreign corporation or to the
shareholders of foreign corporations controlled by United States
interests.24
Encouraging the development of underdeveloped countries was
considered more important than achieving domestic neutrality.
The complete elimination of tax deferral would discourage private
foreign investment in developed and underdeveloped countries
alike and undesirably retard the development of the latter. There-
fore, the President recommended that the deferral privilege be
retained for income originating in underdeveloped areas.25
Even underdeveloped countries provided no justification for
permitting the tax haven device. On the theory that the use of tax
havens upset the United States balance of payments and deferred
investment in the United States, the President advocated
elimination of the tax haven device anywhere in the world, even
in the underprivileged countries, through the elimination of tax
deferral privileges for those forms of activities . . . .There is
22 H.R. Hearings, vol. 1, at 9.
[E]limination of tax deferral in developed countries would have had two types
of effects on our balance of payments. First, there would be smaller net
outflows ... as a consequence of the elimination of the tax inducement
to send capital abroad. The second effect on the balance of payments from
the elimination of tax deferral arises from the fact that there would no
longer be a tax inducement to leave earnings abroad.
Statement of C. Douglas Dillon before the Senate Committee on Finance, "The
Revenue Act of 1962," Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 101 (1962) [hereinafter cited as S. Hearings].
28 "Message of the President of the United States," H.R. Hearings, vol. 1,
at 9.
24 Detailed Explanation of the President's Recommendations Contained in His
Message on Taxation, H.R. Hearings, vol. 1, at 261.
25 Message of the President of the United States, H.R. Hearings, vol. 1, at 9.
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no valid reason to permit their remaining untaxed regardless of
the country in which they are located.
2 6
In summary then, the main points of the President's recom-
mendations with respect to the tax treatment of foreign income
were: (1) elimination of tax deferral in developed countries
through an immediate tax on undistributed profits of a foreign
corporation; (2) retention of tax deferral for corporations in under-
developed countries, and (3) complete elimination of tax havens.2 7
The Administration's proposals were met by a tremendous
amount of opposition from the business and academic community.
Although the use of the tax haven device was generally acknowl-
edged as undesirable, the vast majority of the witnesses appearing
before the congressional committees were opposed to the taxation
of undistributed profits as a method of eliminating tax deferral.2s
Among reasons advanced in opposition to the taxation of undis-
tributed profits were the following: There are often compelling busi-
ness reasons for foreign investment other than tax considerations,
and legitimate foreign business ventures should not be penalized
because of the abusive practices of others; 29 the proposals would not
26 Ibid.
27 These proposals marked a significant reversal in governmental policy. Until
this time it was generally agreed that the promotion of private foreign investment
was a basic objective of the foreign economic policy of the United States. As late
as 1959, Representative Boggs of Louisiana advocated creation of an entity to be
known as a Foreign Business Corporation. Under his proposed bill a domestic
corporation would qualify as a Foreign Business Corporation if it received 90% of
its gross income from foreign sources and 90% of its gross income from the active
conduct of a trade or business. Such a corporation would be subject to tax currently
on its domestic income but could exclude its income from foreign sources until that
income was distributed to its stockholders. It would be entitled to deferral of tax
on its reinvested foreign-business income. Munsche, "The Boggs Bill: A Review
of the Committee Print," 38 Taxes 11, 12 (1960). Also in 1959, C. Douglas Dillon,
then Under Secretary of State, said that the promotion of private foreign investment
was one of the three fundamental economic policies which provided the framework
for dealing with international problems. Dillon, "United States Foreign Trade and
Investment Policies," 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 107, 109. In fairness to Secretary Dillon it
should be pointed out that he was not then speaking from a tax standpoint and his
remarks were directed toward the development of underdeveloped countries, but less
than two years appears to be a short time for a complete reversal of fundamental
economic policy. Not even six months before the President's message, the General
Counsel of the Department of Commerce and an Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury viewed tax inducements (specifically tax deferral) as a desirable stimulus
to foreign investment. See Dodds, "Tax Inducements as a Stimulus to Foreign
Investment by United States Companies," in Taxation and Operations Abroad 232
(1960); Glasmann, "Tax Inducements to Stimulate Foreign Investment from
Treasury Point of View," in Taxation and Operations Abroad 242 (1960).
28 See generally H.R. Hearings and S. Hearings.
29 Statement of Dan Throop Smith, H.R. Hearings, vol. 4, at 2590; S. Hearings,
19651
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
substantially alter the balance of payments problem;30 although
foreign investment may be temporarily detrimental to the balance
of payments, it is favorable in the long run, and unforeseen conse-
quences could result from tampering with existing systems; 31
foreign investment is not an either-here-or-there proposition, but is
made on the basis of sound business considerations; 32 foreign invest-
ment should be encouraged as it is essential that American business
"get in" on European economic growth, which can only be done
through foreign investment; 33 investment in the developed coun-
tries eventually works its way out to some degree to the underde-
veloped countries; 34 foreign investors are forced to take risks to
which domestic enterprises are not subject; 3 shareholders will not
permit the indefinite retention of earnings overseas; 36 to tax income
before it is actually received is not constitutionally justified;3 7 and
existing provisions of the Code could adequately deal with the tax
haven problem. 38
Finally, after eighteen months of hearing, drafting, amending,
revising, and conferring, and after more than nine thousand pages of
testimony had been taken, President Kennedy signed into law the
Revenue Act of 1962.39
pt. 7, at 3089. The references in this and succeeding footnotes are random samplings
and not meant to be exhaustive. Generally more than one witness would advocate
more than one of the reasons set out in the text as justifying retention of tax deferral.
30 Statement of Robert Anthoine, H.R. Hearings, vol. 4, at 3373-74; Statement
of Leon H. Keyserling, S. Hearings, pt. 8, at 3315-18.
3' Statement of Robert Anthoine, supra note 30, at 3373-74; Statement of Leon
H. Keyserling, supra note 30, at 3315-18.
32 Statement of Harold D. Arneson, H.R. Hearings, vol. 4, at 2848-49.
33 Statement of Harold D. Arneson, supra note 32, at 2848.
34 Statement of Harold D. Arneson, supra note 32, at 2848.
35 Statement of Harold D. Arneson, supra note 32, at 2855.
36 Statement of Harold D. Arneson, supra note 32, at 2851.
37 Statement of Adrian A. Kragen, S. Hearings, pt. 7, at 3940; Statement of
John L. Conolly, S. Hearings, pt. 7, at 2895.
38 Statement of Fred W. Peel, H.R. Hearings, vol. 4, at 2618; Statement of
John L. Conolly, S. Hearings, pt. 7, at 2896-97.
39 The bill was introduced in the House on March 12, 1962. 108 Cong. Rec.
3809 (1962). It was reported out by the Committee on Ways and Means on March
16. 108 Cong. Rec. 4475 (1962). Debate in the House took place on March 28 and
29, and the House version of the bill was passed on March 29. 108 Cong. Rec.
5433 (1962). The Senate Committee on Finance reported the bill out on August
16. 108 Cong. Rec. 16722 (1962). Senate debate began in August 24 and the
Senate version of the bill was passed on September 6. 108 Cong. Rec. 18743 (1962).
The Conference Committee reported the bill out on October 1, and both Houses
approved that version on October 2. 108 Cong. Rec. 21724-25, 21768 (1962). President
Kennedy signed the bill into law on October 16. See Cherryman, supra note 7, at
173-75, for a more complete chronological history of the bill's passage through the
two Houses of Congress.
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SUBPART F-CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 40
Congressional response to the President's request for alteration
of the tax treatment of foreign income became section 12 of the
Revenue Act of 1962, which was codified into sections 951-72 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. These sections
comprise Subparts F and G of Part III, Subchapter N of Chapter 1
of the Code. Subpart F constitutes a direct assault on the tax
haven device.41 The basic aim of the provisions of Subpart F can
be quite simply stated: to eliminate the tax haven device through
elimination of tax deferral in the developed countries, and at the
same time to preserve tax incentives for the maintenance of foreign
base companies in less developed countries42 But the statutory pro-
visions and their accompanying regulations are "extremely technical
and complex and do not easily lend themselves to summarization." 43
Under the approach taken by Congress, a new category of cor-
porate entity was created for tax purposes: the controlled foreign
corporation. To qualify as a controlled foreign corporation, an
entity must be organized outside the United States and United
States shareholders must own more than fifty per cent of its total
40 The following summary of the provisions of Subpart F is a general survey of
the statutory provisions and does not purport to be a definitive analysis of their
content. Its purpose is to provide a background for the discussion of section 963
which follows. For further discussion of the provisions of Subpart F and its accom-
panying regulations see S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 78-94 (1962); Cherry-
man, supra note 7; Fisher, "Proposed Regulations on Subpart F Income Reflect
Cautious Treasury Approach," 18 J. Taxation 372 (1963); Hoefs & Bunge, "How
to Minimize the Tax Impact on Foreign Operations Under the 1962 Act," 19 J.
Taxation 346 (1963); Hoefs & Bunge, "Tax Considerations Involved in Inter-
national Business Under the 1962 Revenue Act," 19 J. Taxation 294 (1963); Hughes
"First Foreign Income Regulations Are Adopted: Do They Exceed the Intent of
the Statute?" 20 J. Taxation 24 (1964); McDonald, "Controlled Foreign Corpo-
rations," in 5 Institute on Private Investments Abroad 5 (1963); Miles, "How
'Foreign Base Company Sales Income' Treatment Can Be Avoided," 17 J. Taxation
355 (1962); Naylor & Huber, "Analysis of Proposed 'Tax Haven' Legislation,"
39 Taxes 1006 (1961); Nicholson & Hoefs, "1962 Act: Radical Changes Require
Immediate Re-examination of Foreign Activities," 17 J. Taxation 348 (1962);
Phelps, "How Minimum Distributions Can Reduce Tax on Subpart F Income,"
17 J. Taxation 356 (1962); Saltzman, "Undistributed Income Subject to 'Taint' of
Subpart F is Spelled out by Final Regulations," 21 J. Taxation 110 (1964);
Slowinski, "Foreign Income Provisions of H.R. 10650," U. So. Cal. 1963 Tax Inst.
109; Comment, "Qualified Investment in Less Developed Countries Under The
Revenue Act of 1962," 18 U. Miami L. Rev. 675 (1964).
41 S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1962).
42 Harris, "Foreign Base Companies Under the 1962 Act; Relief Provisions and
Areas for Tax Planning," U. So. Cal. 1964 Tax Inst. 287.
43 Nicholson & Hoefs, supra note 40, at 348.
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voting stock at least one day during its taxable year.4 A United
States shareholder is defined as a United States person owning at
least ten per cent of the corporation's total voting stock.45 There-
fore a foreign corporation becomes a controlled foreign corporation
for the year if, on any day during that year, more than fifty per
cent of the corporation's voting stock is owned by five or fewer
United States persons, provided that each of them owns at least
ten per cent of the corporation's total voting stock.46 In determining
whether or not a foreign corporation qualifies as a controlled foreign
corporation and whether or not a United States person qualifies as
a United States shareholder, stock ownership is to be attributed to
a person whether he owns it directly, indirectly, or constructively.4 7
The rules of section 318(a) generally apply for the purpose of
determining if stock is owned constructively. 8 Indirect ownership
of a foreign corporation's stock occurs where, by virtue of an inter-
est in an intermediate entity, a United States person is considered
owner of a proportionate share of the corporation's stock.4 9 Con-
sider, for example, a domestic corporation, A, holding eighty per
cent of the one class of stock of foreign corporation B, which in turn
owns sixty per cent of the one class of stock of foreign corporation
C. In determining whether or not corporation A is to be considered
a United States shareholder with respect to corporation C, whether
or not corporation C is a controlled foreign corporation, the domes-
tic corporation, A, will be found to own forty-eight per cent of
corporation C because of A's proportional ownership of B's owner-
ship of C.
The shareholders of a foreign corporation which qualifies as a
controlled foreign corporation for thirty consecutive days during
the tax year may be subject to the operative provisions of Subpart
F. A proportionate share of certain types of income must be in-
cluded in the year's gross income by each United States shareholder
owning stock in the corporation on the last day of the taxable year
that it qualifies as a controlled foreign corporation. Even though
no distribution has in fact been made, the shareholder must include
44 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 957(a). Sections 957(b) and 957(c) set out certain
exceptions to this general rule where the corporation engages in the insurance of
United States risks or is organized in Puerto Rico or a United States possession
and meets certain other definitional requirements.
45 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 951(b).
46 A United States person includes a United States citizen, resident, partnership,
corporation, estate, or trust, with minor modifications. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§§ 957(d), 7701 (a) (30).
47 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 958.
48 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 958(b).
49 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 958(a) (2).
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the income in his gross income just as if it had been distributed.50
Three types of undistributed income must be so included: (1) the
United States shareholder's pro rata share of the corporation's Sub-
part F income for that year, (2) the shareholder's pro rata share
of previously excluded Subpart F income which has been withdrawn
from investment in less developed countries during the year, and
(3) the shareholder's pro rata share of the increase in corporate
earnings invested in United States property during the year, but
this latter type of income is includable only to the extent that it
is not otherwise included in the United States shareholder's gross
income.r1 Only income attributable to stock owned directly or in-
directly need be included in the United States shareholder's gross
income. Constructively owned stock is treated as being actually
owned for the purpose of identifying a controlled foreign corpora-
tion and determining United States shareholder status; however,
it is not so treated in determining the United States shareholder's
share of the controlled foreign corporation's Subpart F income
which must be included in the United States shareholder's gross
income.
Thus, before undistributed profits of a foreign corporation may
be taxed under Subpart F, three conditions must be met: (1) The
corporation must be a controlled foreign corporation, (2) for thirty
consecutive days during the year, and (3) Subpart F income must
be realized.
Subpart F income
Subpart F income is divided into two categories: income de-
rived from the insurance of United States risks, and foreign base
company income. 2 Foreign base company income is further broken
down into three subclasses: foreign personal holding company in-
come, foreign base company sales income, and foreign base company
services income.0"
Foreign personal holding company income
Though this income has nearly identical characteristics with
that described in the foreign personal holding company provisions
of the Code,"4 some differences occur respecting income received
from rents, from the active conduct of a trade or business, and from
50 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 951 (a).
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 951 (a).
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 952(a).
53 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 954(a).
54 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 551-57.
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related persons.55 This type of income was included in Subpart F
income because it was felt that no policy justification could be
found for deferral of tax on passively received investment income
or income from portfolio-type investments. 6
Foreign base company sales income
Foreign base company sales income results from a transaction
in which a foreign base company, either directly or on behalf of a
related person, acts as an intermediary in the purchase, sale, or
purchase and sale of personal property.T The statutory provisions
and the examples set out in the regulations make it clear that the
transaction contemplated is one involving three countries and three
corporations-the typical tax haven transaction.5 Thus, where
controlled foreign corporation A in country X purchases goods from
an unrelated person in country Y and sells them to related person B
in country Z, any income on the sale realized by controlled foreign
corporation A is foreign base company sales income. The same
result obtains if controlled foreign corporation A in country X
purchases personal property from related person B in country Z and
sells it to an unrelated person in country Y. If, however, the prop-
erty involved in the sale originated in or is to remain in the con-
trolled foreign corporation's country of incorporation, the income
realized on the sale is not foreign base company sales income.59
Thus, if controlled foreign corporation A in country X purchases
personal property produced in country X, no foreign base company
sales income is realized on a later sale of the property. By the same
token, if a controlled foreign corporation in country X sells per-
sonal property for use or consumption in country X, no foreign
base company sales income is realized.
Foreign base company sales income can also be avoided if the
property which is the subject of the sale is manufactured or pro-
duced by the controlled foreign corporation itself.60 If the character
of the property purchased by the controlled foreign corporation is
substantially altered by manufacture prior to sale, the property will
be treated as having been produced or manufactured by the con-
55 A related person is an individual, partnership, trust, or estate which controls
the controlled foreign corporation; a corporation which controls, or is controlled by,
the controlled foreign corporation; or a corporation controlled by the same person or
persons which control the controlled foreign corporation. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 954(d) (3).
56 S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1962).
57 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 954 (d).
58 Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3 (1963).
59 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.954-3(a) (2), (3) (1963).
60 Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a) (4) (i) (1963).
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trolled foreign corporation. No foreign base company sales income
will be realized on the sale."- "[T]he theory [is] that the same
property... has not been resold if it has gone through a manufac-
turing process which makes it substantially different property." 62
Thus, controlled foreign corporation A in country X can purchase
personal property such as wood pulp from a related person in
country Y, convert it to another form, such as paper, and sell it in
country Z without realizing any foreign base company sales income.
Foreign base company services income
Foreign base company services income is derived from the
controlled foreign corporation's performance of technical, manage-
rial, engineering, commercial, or similar services for or on behalf of
a related person outside the country of incorporation.6 3
Limitations and exclusions
Several limitations and exclusions contained in Subpart F re-
strict or negate the operation of section 951. In defining foreign base
company income, section 954 specifically excludes certain income
received as a return on investments in less developed countries,64
and income from the use of aircraft or vessels in foreign commerce.6 5
Moreover, if foreign base company income comprises less than thirty
per cent of the controlled foreign corporation's gross income, it is
61 Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a) (4) (ii) (1963).
62 Harris, supra note 42, at 302.
63 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 954(e).
64 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 954(b) (1). This exclusion, though at odds with
the statutory goal of eliminating tax deferral, in consistent with foreign policy con-
siderations underlying the bill. In exempting from Subpart F treatment the income
from a qualified investment in a less developed country, Congress intended to preserve
any pre-1962 incentive for capital movement to underdeveloped countries. One
writer has concluded that the opposite result has been effected, and investment in
less developed countries has actually been impeded as a result of the 1962 act.
Popkin, "Less Developed Countries and the Revenue Act of 1962," 40 Ind. L.J. 1
(1964). The President is given authority to designate which countries are to be
considered less developed under Subpart F, though some developed countries are
specifically enumerated by § 995(c) (3). By Exec. Order No. 11071, 27 Fed. Reg.
2875 (1962), President Kennedy designated (with the exception of Spain) every
country in the world not specifically excluded as a less developed country. The
result is that all of Latin America, virtually all of Africa, and all of non-communist
Asia is within the less developed classification. Subpart F will have no effect in
these areas, leaving the tax haven device still available in such Latin American
countries as Panama. Upon withdrawal of Subpart F excluded income from the less
developed country in which the qualified investment has been made, with certain
limitations it will be includible in the United States shareholder's gross income for
the year in which it was withdrawn. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 951(a) (1) (A) (ii),
951(a) (3).
05 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 954(b) (2).
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not to be treated as foreign base company income.6 Deductions are
permitted from Subsection F income to the extent they can be
attributed to that income. 7 Finally, where it is established to the
satisfaction of the Secretary that the creation of the controlled
foreign corporation did not have the effect of substantial reduction
of income or similar taxes, income received by the corporation is not
included in foreign base company income. 8
A further exclusion is found in section 952(b) which provides
that Subpart F income does not include United States-source income
of a foreign corporation which is engaged in a trade or business in
the United States if such income was otherwise includible in the
United States shareholder's gross income. The object of this section
is to avoid the possibility of double taxation with respect to such
income. Without this provision, both the controlled foreign corpora-
tion and the United States shareholder would pay a tax on the same
dollar in the same year.
Section 951 (a) (2) provides a further limitation on the realized
Subpart F income which is includible in gross income. To be in-
cluded is the amount which the United States shareholder would
have received if, on the last day it qualified as a controlled foreign
corporation during the year, the corporation had distributed an
amount bearing the same proportionate relationship to its total
Subpart F income as the part of the year that the corporation
qualified as a controlled foreign corporation bears to the total tax-
able year. Thus, when a corporation qualifies as a controlled foreign
corporation for one-half of the taxable year, the United States share-
holder must include in his gross income his proportionate share of
one-half of the corporation's Subpart F income. The amount to be
included in the shareholder's gross income is to be reduced by any
amount actually received as a dividend by any other person, if that
distribution bears to the total Subpart F income the same relation-
ship as the part of the year in which the shareholder did not own
the stock bears to the entire year.
MINIMUM DISTRIBuTIONS
Theory of the minimum distribution
What may well become the most important method of avoiding
the impact of Subpart F is found in section 963. If the total foreign
and United States taxes paid on an actual dividend distribution
66 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 954(a) (3) (A). On the other hand, § 954(b) (3) (B)
provides that if the foreign base company income exceeds 707 of the controlled
foreign corporation's gross income, all gross income is to be treated as base company
income.
67 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 954(b) (5).
68 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 954(b) (4).
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approximate the United States tax which would otherwise be due,
the advantages of tax deferral are eliminated. In such a case there
will be no incentive to obtain tax deferral and there will be no
necessity to tax the controlled foreign corporation's remaining un-
distributed profits.69
These considerations led Congress to enact "one of the most
complex schemes ever to be devised in the history of tax legisla-
tion. 70 Under section 963, if a certain percentage of the controlled
foreign corporation's earnings and profits are actually distributed,
no amount of its income need be included as Subpart F income in
the gross income of a United States corporate shareholder. A table
is provided for use in correlating this required percentage with the
combined foreign and United States tax rates.71 Broadly stated,
no part of the controlled foreign corporation's income need be in-
cluded in the United States shareholder's gross income if the total
of the United States and foreign taxes paid or accrued amount to
approximately ninety per cent of the United States taxes which
would otherwise be due. Thus, the statutory percentage of earnings
and profits which must be distributed to qualify decreases as the
effective foreign tax rate increases. Where the effective foreign tax
rate is under nine per cent, the minimum distribution must be
eighty-three per cent of the controlled foreign corporation's earnings
and profits in order to qualify under section 963. Conversely, no
distribution is required if the effective foreign tax rate at least is
forty-three per cent. While the provisions of section 963 can easily
be applied to a single isolated transaction, their application to a
complex multicorporate transaction presents problems so formida-
ble that Congress left their solution to the Treasury Department.72
69 McDonald, supra note 40, at 11.
70 Cherrynan, "The New 'Subpart F' Foreign Income Provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code," 4 W.&M. L. Rev. 172, 202 (1963).
71 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 963(b). The table referred to throughout this
comment is found in § 963(b) (3), and is applicable to years beginning after
December 31, 1964.
72 As one author has pointed out:
One of the biggest problems with respect to applying section 963 is that of
computing the earnings and profits for foreign tax purposes. This task is
complicated enough for domestic corporation situations. In CFC situations
there must be superimposed many other factors, such as depreciation calcu-
lations on foreign assets ... the gyrating rates of foreign currency exchange;
consolidated returns . . . the variegated types of foreign reserve accounts,
some of them secret; the blocked foreign income exemption found in section
964(b) ; the possible election to take up sales income in installments;
differing foreign accounting methods, and the foreign language from which
all this must be translated. Code section 963(f) leaves to the Treasury
Department the chore of weaving these threads into an intelligible pattern,
including providing "regulations for the determination of the amount of
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The Treasury has now promulgated regulations which attempt
to meet these problems. 73 Predictably, the new regulations are
lengthy, technical, and extremely complex. They are intended to
perform a variety of functions: defining of terms, setting out the
procedure for making an election under section 963, prescribing
the method for determining the minimum amount which must be
distributed to qualify as a minimum distribution, and determin-
ing what type of distributions will count toward a minimum dis-
tribution.74
Types of elections
The provisions of section 963 are permissive and they are availa-
ble only to the taxpayer who complies with the Treasury's terms
as set out in the regulations. If these terms are met, four distinct
alternatives are available to a United States corporate taxpayer
faced with the prospect of United States income taxation on un-
distributed profits of a controlled foreign corporation. First, it may
elect to exclude from its gross income the Subpart F income of any
single controlled foreign corporation in which it owns stock directly.7 5
Second, it may elect to exclude the Subpart F income of any series
of foreign corporations which contains no more than one corpora-
tion not a controlled foreign corporation.76 Third, it may elect to
exclude the Subpart F income of any group of foreign corporations
which includes all of the controlled foreign corporations in which
the United States shareholder directly or indirectly owns stock.7 7
Finally, the United States shareholder may make a section 963 elec-
tion to exclude amounts otherwise includable in gross income by
virtue of stock ownership, direct or indirect, in a controlled foreign
corporation if the stockholder's ownership is in a less-developed-
country corporation.7"
The first mentioned alternative above is called a first-tier elec-
tion.79 Under this type of election, if a United States corporate
foreign tax credit in the case of distributions with respect to the earnings
and profits of two or more foreign corporations."
Cherryman, supra note 70, at 202-03.
73 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.963-1 to -7 (1964), as amended, T. D. 6767, 1964 Int. Rev.
Bull. No. 47, at 68-72. The amendment was promulgated in order to make certain
minor or technical amendments, and, therefore, will not hereinafter be cited in
conjunction with Treas. Reg. § 1.963 (1964).
74 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-1 (a) (1) (1964).
75 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 963(c) (1).
76 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 963(c) (2).
77 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 963 (c) (3).
78 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 963(c) (4) (A).
79 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-1(c) (1) (i) (a) (1964).
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shareholder owns stock directly in one or more controlled foreign
corporations, it may make an election under section 963 with respect
to the stock owned in any one of these corporations or any com-
bination thereof.80
The second alternative, called a chain election, is more compli-
cated since it involves a more complex corporate scheme. The chain
election allows a United States shareholder that holds stock in one
or more controlled foreign corporations indirectly to avail himself
to an exclusion under section 963 with respect to the income of these
corporations."' If the shareholder is deemed to have an interest in
more than one chain, the election is permissible with respect to any
one of the chains, or any combination thereof. For example, suppose
domestic corporation A owns stock directly in controlled foreign
corporation B. Suppose further that corporation B owns stock of
controlled foreign corporation C, which in turn owns stock in con-
trolled foreign corporation D. If domestic corporation A owns stock
in controlled foreign corporation E, which in turn also owns stock
in controlled foreign corporation D, there are two chains of owner-
ship, each having corporation A at its head: chain A-B-C-D and
chain A-E-D. If the holdings are sufficiently large to make domestic
corporation A a United States shareholder with respect to all these
corporations, corporation A would have to include in its gross income
its proportionate share of the Subpart F income of these corpora-
tions. Under section 963 corporation A can exclude some or all of
this income from its gross income by electing to receive a minimum
distribution from either one or both complete chains or from a seg-
ment of either or both chains so long as none of the links in any
one chain is skipped. 2
The third type of election available to the United States corpo-
rate shareholder is the group election. 3 It allows the shareholder to
make the 963 election to exclude from gross income the propor-
tionate share of the earnings of controlled foreign corporations in
80 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-1(c) (1) (i) (a) (1964). Thus, if a domestic corporation is
a United States shareholder with respect to controlled foreign corporations A, B, and
C, a first-tier election can be made in the following combinations: A only; B only;
C only; A and B; A and C; B and C; or A, B, and C.
81 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-1(c) (1) (i) (b) (1964). By implication the regulations
provide that the election is not available if more than one of the corporations in
the chain is not a controlled foreign corporation. Treas. Reg. § 1.963-1 (e) (1) (1964).
82 Possible combinations would include the following: B and C; B, C, and
D; E and D; or B and C as one chain and E and D as another chain. While the
regulations do not specifically provide for it, no objection appears to a chain election
with respect to corporations B and C, or B, C, and D, and a first-tier election with
respect to controlled foreign corporation E.
83 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-1 (c) (1) (ii) (1964).
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which it owns stock either directly or indirectly, and of all foreign
corporations, controlled or noncontrolled, through which the United
States shareholder indirectly holds stock in a controlled foreign
corporation. 4 If a group election is made, foreign branches of the
United States shareholder may be included in the group and be
treated as wholly-owned subsidiaries of the shareholder which sub-
sidiaries have made a full distribution of earnings and profits to the
United States shareholder during the year. 5
The fourth possible election is a variant of the group election.
In effect a group election is made, but controlled foreign corpora-
tions which qualify as less-developed-country corporations under
section 955 need not be included in the group. 6
The required amount
Section 1.963-2 of the regulations sets out the method for de-
termining the amount which must be distributed in order for the
distribution to qualify as a minimum distribution. The first step in
this determination is the computation of the United States share-
holder's effective foreign tax rate with respect to the corporation
or corporations in connection with which the election is made. After
the effective foreign tax rate is determined, reference to the table
in section 963 (b) reveals the statutory percentage of the controlled
foreign corporation's earnings and profits which must be distributed
to meet the requirements of section 963. Applying this percentage
to the earnings and profits of the corporations for which the election
is made produces the dollar amount of the distribution which quali-
fies as a minimum distribution under section 963.
Two factors are considered in the determination of the effective
foreign tax rate: the United States shareholder's proportionate share
of the foreign corporation's foreign income taxes for the year, 7 and
the United States shareholder's proportionate share of the foreign
corporation's earnings and profits for the year.8 The effective for-
eign tax rate is computed as follows: First, the sum of the United
States shareholder's proportionate share of the foreign income taxes
of the chain or group and the United States shareholder's propor-
84 A foreign corporation may be excluded from a group election if it is established
that a minimum distribution cannot be made due to the currency or other limitations
imposed by the law of a foreign country. Treas. Reg. § 1.963-1(f) (3) (1964).
s5 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-1(f) (4) (1964).
86 If a group election is made and such corporations are excluded from the
group, a first-tier election cannot be made with respect to such corporations. Treas.
Reg. § 1.963-1(f)(1) (1964).
87 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-2(e) (1) (1964).
88 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-2(d) (1964). The computation of the minimum distri-
bution is based on a percentage of the foreign corporation's total earnings and profits,
not just the earnings and profits which constitute Subpart F income.
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tionate share of the foreign corporation's earnings and profits is
found. Then the percentage which the United States shareholder's
proportionate share of the foreign income taxes bears to the sum
thus arrived at, is found. This percentage is the effective foreign tax
rate."9 Thus, if the United States shareholder's proportionate share
of the foreign income taxes of the foreign corporation is thirty dol-
lars, and the United States shareholder's proportionate share of the
foreign corporation's earnings and profits is seventy dollars, the sum
of the two will be one hundred dollars and the United States share-
holder's effective foreign tax rate with respect to the foreign cor-
poration is thirty per cent. [30/(70+30)].90
In section 1.963-4 of the regulations, the Treasury Department
has set out special rules to be observed when a chain or group
election is made. They establish the method for computing the
minimum overall tax burden that will enable a distribution to
qualify as a minimum distribution under section 963. While these
special rules appear to go beyond the scope of the statutory pro-
visions, their validity will probably be immune to attack since they
are obviously aimed at a possible method of avoiding both the tax
and the minimum distribution envisioned by Subpart F. The statu-
tory provisions suggest the possibility of making a chain or group
election in such a way as to combine income from a corporation in
a country with a relatively high income tax rate and income from
a corporation in a country with a relatively low income tax rate.
Such a combination will reduce the effect of Subpart F and could
conceivably permit a type of averaging of the foreign income taxes
of the two countries and result in complete avoidance of tax which
would otherwise be due. For example, suppose domestic corporation
A owns all of the stock of controlled foreign corporation B which
has income of 1,000 dollars and is incorporated in a country with
a forty-seven per cent income tax rate. Suppose further that cor-
poration A owns all of the stock of controlled foreign corporation
C which has income of one hundred dollars and is incorporated in
a country with a three per cent income tax rate. A first-tier election
with respect to these corporations will result in a required distribu-
tion of eighty dollars.91 However, if a group election is made with
respect to these corporations, all of the Subpart F income allocable
s9 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-2(c) (1964).
9o This percentage is then applied to the table in § 963(b) to determine the
percentage of earnings and profits which must be distributed to qualify as a minimum,
distribution. In the example given above, the percentage of earnings and profits which
must be distributed to obtain an exclusion under § 963 is 89%.
91 Controlled foreign corporation B need not make any distribution since its
effective foreign tax rate (47%) is greater than 43%. To qualify for exclusion,
corporation C must make a distribution of 83% of $97, or $80.
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to the United States shareholder's interests can be excluded from
the United States shareholder's gross income and no minimum
distribution will be required."
To prevent this, section 1.963-4 of the regulations provides
that, even if a distribution is made which would quantitatively
qualify as a minimum distribution for the chain or group, no exclu-
sion will be allowed unless one of three alternative tests is met.
The first alternative test, the ninety per cent rule, is that the
sum of the United States and foreign income taxes paid or accrued
by the chain or group with respect to the distribution in question
must equal or exceed a specified minimum. This minimum equals
ninety per cent of the product of the following multiplication: The
sum of the foreign income taxes and the consolidated earnings and
profits of the chain or group times the percentage which equals the
sum of the normal tax rate and the surtax rate.93 If this minimum
is met, the total United States and foreign taxes paid with respect
to the destribution will be within ten percentage points of the United
States tax which would be due under Subpart F on the earnings
and profits of the chain or group if no distribution had been made.
Thus, this requirement supports the statutory aim of exempting
undistributed Subpart F income from taxation if the taxes already
borne by such income approximate the United States tax which
would be paid absent deferral.
The second alternative test for allowing exclusion is satisfied
where the distribution qualifies as a pro rata distribution and the
special rules of sections 1.963-4(b) and 1.963-4(c) of the regula-
tions are met.94 A pro rata distribution occurs when the amount
distributed is allocated according to the statutory percentage of the
earnings and profits of each foreign corporation in the chain or
group.95 Thus, suppose the statutory percentage of the earnings
and profits which must be distributed in order to qualify as a mini-
mum distribution is sixty-nine per cent of the earnings and profits
of the chain or group. Foreign corporations A, B, C, and D, as mem-
bers of the chain or group, must each contribute sixty-nine per cent
of their individual earnings and profits to the distribution in order
that it may qualify as a pro rata minimum distribution. It is not
enough that the total distribution is adequate to meet the sixty-nine
per cent requirement; the percentage requirement must be met
with respect to each corporation in the chain or group.
92 Combining the United States and foreign income taxes of the two corporations
results in an effective foreign tax rate of 43%.
93 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(a) (1) (i) (1964). Foreign income taxes deemed paid
under § 904(d) are not included. Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(a) (2) (ii) (1964).
94 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(a) (1) (ii) (a) (1964).
95 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(a) (2) (i) (1964)
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The third alternative test is met by reducing the amount of the
allowable foreign tax credit on the income involved in the distribu-
tion and by complying with the special rules of section 1.963-4(b)
and 1.963-4(c) of the regulations. 6 In effect, the allowable foreign
tax credit must be reduced to the extent necessary to make the over-
all United States and foreign taxes paid in connection with the
distribution equal or exceed the lesser of the total taxes which would
be paid or accrued using one of the two preceding tests. Thus, the
allowable foreign tax credit must be reduced until the overall United
States and foreign income taxes deemed paid with respect to the
distribution equal the amount of the United States and foreign
taxes which would be due if a pro rata distribution was made, or the
total must equal at least ninety per cent of the United States tax
which would otherwise be due if the earnings and profits of the
chain or group were not distributed.
It is readily apparent that these three tests are alternative
routes to the same ultimate goal which underlies the entire frame-
work of section 963. Meeting these requirements means that either
each corporate member of the chain or group must disgorge the
statutory percentage of earnings and profits as dividends, thus
eliminating the averaging effect, or the total United States and
foreign taxes paid will approximate the United States tax which
would otherwise be due on the foreign corporation's income. If any
one of these tests is met, tax deferral is effectively eliminated.
Special rules
Section 1.963-4(b) of the regulations sets out special rules for
determining the earnings and profits and the foreign income taxes
of foreign corporations in a chain or group. The provisions of this
paragraph fall into three general divisions. They provide first that
foreign income taxes of a foreign corporation are to be taken into
account in determining the effective foreign tax rate only if they are
not included in the foreign tax credit for the year.97 Secondly, if
one or more foreign corporations, including branches treated as
foreign subsidiaries, suffers a deficit during the taxable year, this
deficit is to be ratably allocated throughout the other foreign cor-
porations in the chain or group; the United States shareholder's
proportionate share of the earnings and profits of each foreign cor-
poration in the chain or group is to be proportionately reduced.
The third subparagraph of this section provides that where dis-
tributions are made successively through a chain or group, the
90 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(a) (1) (ii) (b) (1964).
o7 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(b) (1) (1964).
9s Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(b) (2) (1964).
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amounts so distributed will be considered to have been received
from the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation and
allocated to the earnings and profits of the recipient corporation.
When the recipient corporation then makes a distribution, that dis-
tribution will be deemed to come from the earnings and profits of
the first corporation.99 For example, suppose that controlled for-
eign corporation B receives a dividend of sixty dollars from con-
trolled foreign corporation C, which dividend would count toward
a minimum distribution. Suppose further that corporation B dis-
tributes a dividend of fifty dollars to corporation A. If corporations
B and C are in a chain for which a 963 election is made by corpora-
tion A, the entire fifty dollars distributed by corporation B will be
deemed to have come from the sixty dollars received from corpora-
tion C. Corporation B will not be considered to have made any dis-
tribution of its earnings and profits which can be counted toward
a minimum distribution.
Perhaps the most formidable problem to be encountered under
section 963 is that of determining the amount of the foreign tax
credit for distributions involving two or more foreign corporations.
Congress considered this problem to be so difficult that its solution
was specifically left to the Secretary to be resolved in the regula-
tions.1°° The Treasury Department's response to this statutory
mandate is section 1.963-4(c) of the regulations, easily the longest
and most complicated section of a thoroughly complex scheme.
This paragraph provides that, where a chain or group of foreign
corporations is involved, the United States shareholder's foreign
tax credit with respect to a minimum distribution is to be deter-
mined the same way that a regular foreign tax credit is determined
under sections 901-05, but with the five following modifications.
First, when a United States shareholder receives a distribution
of the earnings and profits of a second-tier foreign corporation which
have been "passed through" a first-tier foreign corporation, the
foreign income taxes paid by the second-tier corporation are not
averaged with the earnings and profits of the first-tier corporation,
the usual method under section 902(b). Rather, they are passed
through the first-tier corporation at their full dollar-for-dollar
value.' 0
Second, foreign income taxes paid by the foreign corporation
on its earnings and profits which are used for the minimum distribu-
tion to the United States shareholder are to be kept separate from
99 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(b) (3) (1964).
100 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 963(f).
101 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(c) (1) (i) (a) (1964).
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the foreign income taxes paid on other earnings of the foreign
corporation.
10 2
Third, a deficit of another corporation in the chain or group
reduces a United States shareholder's proportionate share of the
earnings and profits of another foreign corporation belonging to
the chain or group. In this situation no foreign tax credit is applic-
able to the amount distributed by the profitable corporation to the
extent that the amount distributed exceeds the shareholder's
reduced proportionate share of the earnings of the distributing
corporation. 103 For example, suppose that the United States share-
holder's proportionate share of the earnings and profits of a foreign
corporation has been reduced to fifty dollars because of a deficit
for that year in another corporate member of the chain or group.
If the distribution of the corporation's earnings and profits for that
year is sixty dollars, no foreign tax credit is available for taxes paid
on the last ten dollars of the distribution because to that extent the
distribution exceeds the United States shareholder's proportionate
share of the earnings and profits of the corporation. Without this
provision, no United States tax is due in a situation where the
losses of one corporation offset the gains of another corporation,
and there are no consolidated earnings and profits taxable under
a group election. Yet the profitable corporation could claim a foreign
tax credit which could be carried over into succeeding years.
Fourth, the United States shareholder may reduce the foreign
tax credit and defer the amount of the reduction to another year
by following subparagraph (c) (3) of section 1.963-4 which, by
reference to paragraph (a) (1) (i) (b) of section 1.963-4, operates
in the following manner: The section 901 foreign tax credit appli-
cable to the distribution is reduced by the amount necessary to
make the year's total of United States and foreign taxes on the
income involved in the distribution equal or exceed a calculated
minimum. This minimum is the lesser of (a) the total of the United
States and foreign income taxes which would be paid in the event
a pro rata distribution is made, or (b) ninety per cent of the amount
arrived at by multiplying the sum of the earnings and profits and
the consolidated foreign income taxes of the corporation times a
percentage equal to the sum of the normal tax rate and the surtax
rate. The amount of the foreign tax credit which is disallowed can
then be deferred until distribution of the remaining profits earned
during the taxable year in question. At that time, the deferred tax
credit is applied ratably against such earnings and profits. Thus, if
a group election is made and part of the earnings and profits of the
102 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(d) (1) (i) (b) (1964).
103 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(c) (1) (i) (c) (1964).
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foreign corporations are distributed in a manner which does not
meet the ninety per cent requirement [without applying the special
rules of paragraphs (b) and (c)], or does not qualify as a pro rata
distribution, some of the foreign tax credit may not be available to
the United States shareholder. However, the amount not allowed
can be deferred until an additional portion of the heretofore undis-
tributed earnings and profits are distributed.""
Finally, the special foreign tax credit rules provide that the
grossing-up provisions of section 78 are not applicable in determin-
ing the foreign tax credit allowable with respect to the minimum
distribution.
Corporations in countries with variable tax rates
The foreign income tax may vary with the proportion of the
corporation's earnings and profits which are distributed; e.g., un-
distributed profits may be taxed at one rate while distributed profits
are taxed at another rate. This situation occasions slightly different
treatment under section 963 in the case of single first-tier corpora-
tions or corporations in a chain or group whose minimum overall
tax burden is determined by the special rules of section 1.963-4(b)
and -4(c) of the regulations. This modified treatment occurs when
a pro rata distribution is made or when the foreign tax credit is
reduced. The effective foreign tax rate is determined as follows:
If the United States shareholder receives its proportionate share
of the earnings and profits which are actually distributed by the
foreign corporation, the foreign income tax on the pretax and pre-
distribution earnings and profits is to be determined as if the foreign
corporation had made no distributions during the year.'- 5 However,
the United States shareholder may not actually receive its pro-
portionate share of the distributed earnings and profits of the foreign
corporation, where, for example, a distribution received by a first-tier
foreign corporation is not "passed through" to the United States
shareholder. Then, in determining the effective foreign tax rate, the
corporation's foreign income tax on its pretax and predistribution
earnings and profits will be considered equal to the foreign income
tax which actually was due in light of the distributions which were
actually made.
104 There is a possibility that all, or at least part, of the deferred credit can be
irretrievably lost. One limitation placed on the use of the deferred credit is that the
amount of the credit for the year is not to exceed the tax for the year and no carry-
back or carry-over is available with respect to the deferred tax credit. Thus, if the
United States shareholder's tax due on the proceeds of the distribution is exceeded
by the sum of the foreign tax credit available to reduce taxes on the earnings and
profits for the current year plus the amount of the available deferred tax credit, the
excess is unavailable and cannot be deferred until a later date.
105 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-5 (1964).
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If the foreign tax on undistributed profits is higher than the
tax on distributed profits, to the extent that distributions are
actually made, this section may work to the advantage of the United
States shareholder. For example, take the case of a second-tier
corporation in a country which taxes undistributed earnings and
profits at a rate of fifty per cent and taxes distributed earnings and
profits at a rate of twenty per cent. If this corporation has earnings
and profits of one hundred dollars which it retains, or if they are
distributed to a first-tier corporation which retains them, the foreign
income tax actually due will be fifty dollars. This figure will also be
used in determining the effective foreign tax rate of the chain or
group of which the second-tier corporation is a member where an
election under section 963 is made. If, on the other hand, the one
hundred dollars is distributed to a first-tier corporation, which in
turn distributes it to the United States shareholder, the foreign
tax actually due will be twenty dollars. However, for the purpose
of determining the effective foreign tax rate, fifty dollars is still
considered the amount of the foreign tax which has been paid. 10 6
This differential could become significant in determining the
minimum which must be distributed to qualify for a section 963
minimum distribution exclusion; a variance in the effective foreign
tax rate could produce a different statutory minimum percentage.
Unfortunately for the taxpayer, this is a one-way street. For if the
foreign taxes on earnings and profits increases as distributions are
made, for example, as when the foreign tax rate on distributed
profits is higher than the foreign tax rate on undistributed profits,
the general rule applicable to foreign corporations in countries hav-
ing variable tax rates will apply. The provision for using the actual
foreign tax due is specifically made available only where "the United
States shareholder owns the stock... in such corporation by reason
of stock owned through a chain of ownership . . . and the foreign
income tax of such corporation for the taxable year decreases as
distribution are made from its earnings and profits." 107 The fol-
lowing example illustrates this provision. A second-tier corporation
operating in a country which taxes undistributed earnings and
profits at a rate of twenty per cent and distributed profits at a
rate of fifty per cent has earnings of one hundred dollars. These
earnings may be retained or distributed to a first-tier corporation
which retains them. The foreign income tax due will be twenty
dollars, the amount also used in determining the effective foreign
tax rate under section 963. Conversely, the second-tier corporation
distributes the one hundred dollars to the first-tier corporation, and
the latter in turn distributes them to the United States shareholder,
106 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-5(b) (1964).
107 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-5(b) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
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the foreign tax actually due will be fifty dollars. However, for the
purpose of determining the effective foreign tax rate, the foreign
income tax on pretax and predistribution earnings and profits will
be determined under section 963 as though the foreign corporation
made no distributions for the taxable year.
This appears to be a curious result if the statutory goal was to
discourage foreign investment or, in the alternative, to encourage
repatriation of capital through the use of minimum distributions.
To the extent that the total foreign and United States tax burden
on each distributed dollar exceeds the total United States tax burden
on each retained dollar, there is incentive to retain the earnings in
the foreign corporation, optimal tax treatment can then be achieved
by paying the foreign tax, including the income in gross income
under Subpart F, and utilizing the foreign tax credit provisions.
Where the foreign tax rate on distributed profits exceeds the United
States tax rate there is no incentive at all to make any distributions
whatsoever. To distribute the earnings could result in an effective
foreign tax rate lower than the foreign taxes actually paid. Thus, to
qualify for an exclusion under section 963, a larger distribution must
be made than would otherwise be necessary.
Section 1.963-5 of the regulations also prescribes the method
to be used by a foreign corporation in a country with variable tax
rates when the minimum distribution necessary to qualify for an
exclusion under section 963 is being computed.10 8 Three specific
types of situations are described: a distribution by a single-tier
corporation, a pro rata distribution by a corporation in a chain or
group, and a non-pro rata distribution by a corporation in a chain
or group. The method of computation is similar in all three situa-
tions. Such a corporation must minimally distribute an amount
found by multiplying the statutory percentage of earnings and
profits which must be distributed to qualify as a minimum distribu-
tion, times the United States shareholder's proportionate share of
the earnings and profits of the corporation, chain, or group, and
then reducing this product by the foreign income tax which would
be paid or accrued on the pre-United States tax amount. This last
amount is determined by multiplying the statutory percentage times
the United States shareholder's proportionate share of the earnings
and profits less such foreign taxes. Thus, in computing the amount
of the distribution that will qualify for an exclusion under section
963 where the foreign corporation is in a country where the income
tax rates vary according to the distributions made, the procedure
is as follows: (1) determine the statutory percentage of earnings
and profits which must be distributed to qualify for exclusion as a
108 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-5 (1964).
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minimum distribution by determining the effective foreign tax rate
and applying the table in section 963 (b), (2) determine the United
States shareholder's proportionate share of the earnings and profits
of the foreign corporation, (3) multiply the statutory percentage
by the United States shareholder's proportionate share of the cor-
poration's earnings and profits, (4) determine the foreign income
taxes which would be due on that amount if it were distributed, and
(5) deduct from the amount in item (3), the foreign income taxes
which would be due on that amount. The remainder is the amount
which will qualify as a minimum distribution.
Deficiency distributions
If, by a closing agreement; an agreement between the district
director and the shareholder; a decision of the Tax Court; or a final
order, judgment, or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction,
it is determined that a United States shareholder failed to receive
an amount which was sufficient to qualify as a minimum distribu-
tion, and that such failure was due to reasonable cause,10 9 the share-
holder can receive a deficiency distribution which will count toward
the distribution which was inadequate as a minimum distribution.".0
In order to count toward a minimum distribution, the deficiency
distribution must, to the extent possible, be made from the earnings
and profits of the corporation for the year in which was made the
distribution which was intended as a minimum distribution. The
deficiency distribution will be treated as having been received by
the United States shareholder in that year.
ALTERNATIVE ELECTIONS UNDER SECTION 963: A CASE STUDY
The following examples partially illustrate the preceding com-
mentary by describing several different alternatives available to the
United States shareholder in the same hypothetical factual
situation."'
Facts: Corporation A is a domestic corporation with substan-
tial foreign holdings. It owns eighty per cent of the one class of stock
109 Reasonable cause will be found if the United States shareholder receives
80% of the amount which would be required to qualify as a minimum distribution
and there is no evidence of bad faith. If less than 80% of the amount which would
qualify as a minimum distribution is received, the taxpayer must demonstrate reason-
able cause by clear and convincing evidence. Treas. Reg. § 1.963-6(b) (4) (1964).
110 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-6 (1964).
111 The complexity of the subject matter precludes a single illustration's embody-
ing every aspect of the minimum distributions provisions. Among the topics not
treated in the examples are the allocation of deficits among a chain or group, the
possibility of treating foreign branches as subsidiaries, and deficiency distributions.'
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of controlled foreign corporation B. The latter corporation, B, owns
sixty per cent of the one class of stock of controlled foreign cor-
poration C, which in turn owns eighty per cent of the one class of
stock of controlled foreign corporation D. Corporation A also owns
five per cent of the one class of stock of foreign corporation E, not
a controlled foreign corporation. Corporation E owns eighty per
cent of the one class of stock of controlled foreign corporation F,
which in turn owns seventy-five per cent of the one class of stock
of controlled foreign corporation G. Corporation C also owns the
twenty per cent of the one class of stock of corporation F not held
by corporation B. None of the foreign corporations qualify as less
developed country corporations or have any blocked foreign income.
Each of the foreign corporations has pretax and predistribution
earnings and profits of one hundred dollars exclusive of any divi-
dends received. Each of the controlled foreign corporations has
Subpart F income which would be includible in the gross income
of a United States shareholder.
The foreign corporations are subject to foreign income taxes
at the following rates: corporation B at five per cent of earnings
and profits, corporation C at thirty per cent of earnings and profits,
corporation D at forty-five per cent of earnings and profits, cor-
poration E at twenty per cent of earnings and profits, corporation
F at forty per cent of earnings and profits, and corporation G at
forty per cent of undistributed earnings and profits and twenty per
cent of distributed earnings and profits.
Each foreign corporation makes a distribution from earnings
and profits for the current taxable year in the following amounts:
corporation B, thirty dollars; corporation C, sixty dollars, corpo-
ration D, forty dollars; corporation B, one hundred dollars; corpo-
ration F, sixty dollars; and corporation G, forty dollars.
If corporation A wishes to exclude some or all of the foreign
corporations' Subpart F income from its gross income by electing
to receive a minimum distribution under section 963, various alter-
natives are possible. The following discussion illustrates them.
First-tier election
Corporation B is the only corporation with respect to which
corporation A can make a first-tier election.- 2 The amount to be
distributed to qualify as a minimum distribution is computed as
follows:
112 A first-tier election can be made only with respect to a controlled foreign
corporation in which the United States shareholder owns stock directly. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.963-1(d) (i) (1964). Corporation A owns stock directly only in corporations
B and E. Since a United States shareholder is a United States person who owns at
least 100% of the voting stock of a controlled foreign corporation and corporation A
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a. Determination of the effective foreign tax rate: 113
(1) Determination of corporation A's proportionate
share of corporation B's earnings and profits :114
Pretax and predistribution earnings and profits . $100.00
Dividends received ......................... 60.00
Pretax earnings and profits ................ $160.00
Less: Foreign income taxes paid or accrued 8.00
Earnings and profits ...................... $152.00
Corporation A's proportionate share of corpora-
tion B's earnings and profits. (.80 x 152) ..... $121.60
(2) Determination of corporation A's proportionate
share of corporation B's foreign income taxes: 115
Corporation A's proportionate share of corpora-
tion B's foreign income taxes (.80 x 8) ........ $ 6.40
(3) Determination of the effective foreign tax rate:
Effective foreign tax rate [6.40/(121.60 + 6.40) ] 5%
b. Statutory percentage under section 963(b) (3) ..... 83%
c. Required amount of minimum distribution to qualify
for exclusion. 10
Required minimum distribution (.83 x 121.60) ..... $100.93
Less: Distributions already made (.80 x 30) 117... 24.00
Amount which remains to be distributed by corpora-
tion B in order to qualify as a minimum distribution $ 76.93
Chain election
If corporation A elects to make a chain election there are sev-
eral alternatives available. Such an election can be made for any
combination of one or more of corporations B, C, D, E, F, and G,
owns only 5% of the stock of corporation E, corporation A is not a United States
shareholder with respect to corporation E and need not include in its gross income
any Subpart F income of corporation E not attributable to dividends received by
corporation E from a controlled foreign corporation. However, the fact that cor-
poration A is not a United States shareholder with respect to corporation E does
not mean that it is not a United States shareholder with respect to second-tier cor-
porations in a chain in which corporation E forms a link. For example, by virtue
of its 5% interest in corporation E, corporation A indirectly owns 4% of the voting
stock of corporation F. By virtue of its 80% interest in corporation B, corporation
A indirectly owns 48% of the voting stock of corporation C, which indirectly makes
corporation A the owner of an additional 9Y2% of corporation F. Combining this
with the 4% owned through corporation E makes corporation A a United States
shareholder with respect to corporation F, and, indirectly, of corporation G. If cor-
poration A decides to make a first-tier election, only the Subpart F income of
corporation B can be excluded. The Subpart F income of the other controlled
foreign corporations must be included in corporation A's gross income.
113 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-2(c) (1) (1964).
114 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-2(d) (1964).
115 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-2(e) (1) (1964).
116 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-2(a) (1964).
117 Corporation A received 80% of the $30 distributed by corporation B.
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with the following limitations: First, if corporation C is included in
a chain, corporation B must also be included; second, if corporation
D is included in a chain, corporation C must be included; third,
if corporation F is included in a chain, either corporation E or cor-
poration C must also be included; finally, if corporation C is in-
cluded in a chain, corporation F must also be included.
Because of the similarity in computing the minimum distribu-
tion in the case of both chain and group elections, the computation
of the minimum amount required to be distributed in the event of
a chain election will not be illustrated.
Group election
If, under a group election, the special rules of regulation's
paragraphs 1.963-4(b) and (c) are not applied, section 1.963-4(a)
(1)(i) defines the minimum qualifying distribution. It must be
such that the overall United States and foreign tax burden is at
least ninety per cent of this product: The sum of the consolidated
earnings and profits and consolidated foreign income taxes of the
group times the added percentages of the United States normal tax
and surtax rates. Thus, if corporation A should make a group elec-
tion under this provision and then also apply the taxes on inter-
corporate dividends to the determination of the effective foreign
tax rate-rather than toward the minimum distribution-a mini-
mum possible distribution for exclusion would be computed as
follows: [See Exhibit A]
If corporation A receives 66.99 dollars in additional distribu-
tions from the earnings and profits of the group, it can exclude from
its gross income the Subpart F income of the group. That will make
the total distributions from the earnings and profits of the group
equal 95.99 dollars. The overall United States and foreign income
tax burden on such distribution (102.16 dollars) exceeds the mini-
mum overall tax burden of 84.32 dollars.
The minimum qualifying pro rata distribution occurs when
each foreign corporation distributes the statutory percentage of
its earnings and profits equivalent to a minimum distribution. In
the event of a pro rata minimum distribution, it is proper to apply
the special rules of regulations section 1.963-4, which concerns the
determination of earnings and profits and the foreign tax credit
with respect to the United States shareholder. Should corporation
A elect to receive a pro rata minimum distribution from the group
the amount of the distribution would be computed as follows:
the amount of the distribution would be computed as follows: [See
Exhibit B]
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Comparison of this result with that in the preceding illustration
shows that significant tax differences can be obtained by different
elections made by a United States shareholder. It also emphasizes
the importance of making a thorough analysis of the tax conse-
quences before any distribution is made by a foreign corporation.
In the preceding illustration a further distribution of 66.99 dollars
would have satisfied the minimum distribution requirement. It
could have been made by any of the corporations or from any
combination of them. In the case of a pro rata distribution the
United States shareholder must receive specific additional distribu-
tions aggregating 86.69 dollars from specific corporations in order
to receive a qualifying pro rata distribution. Furthermore, the
amounts indicated are the amounts which the United States share-
holder must receive from each corporation respectively, not the
amount which the corporation itself must distribute. For example,
in order for the United States shareholder to receive the necessary
sixty-nine cents from corporation D, corporation D must make a
total distribution of 1.79 dollars; in order for the United States
shareholder to receive the necessary forty-four cents from corpora-
tion E, corporation E must make a total distribution of 8.80 dollars.
The regulations permit a United States shareholder to elect to
make a distribution qualify as a minimum distribution by reducing
its allowable foreign tax credit for the current year. 30 The tax credit
reduction must be sufficient to make the overall United States and
foreign income taxes deemed paid for the year equal to or greater
than the lesser of: (1) the overall United States and foreign income
taxes which would be paid or accrued if a pro rata distribution were
made, or (2) ninety per cent of the United States tax which would
be due on the sum of the consolidated earnings and profits and
foreign income taxes of the group. The reduction in the foreign
tax credit can then be deferred to subsequent years. The amount of
the reduction is allocated among first- and second-tier corpora-
tions only.131
Paragraph (c) (3) of section 1.963-4 of the regulations illus-
trates the method for making such an election. The following is a
sample computation of a reduction in the foreign tax credit made
with such an election. For the purpose of this illustration the facts
used in the preceding examples will be the same except that it is
assumed that no distributions are made by any of the corporations
other than as indicated below. The operation of section 1.963-4(a)
(1) (ii) (b) would be as follows: [See Exhibit C]
130 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(a) (1) (ii) (b) (1964).
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.963-4(c) (3) (ii) (1964).
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The overall United States and foreign income taxes with respect
to the distribution are less under the ninety per cent rule (84.33
dollars) than they would be if a pro rata distribution were made
(91.46 dollars). If the group makes a distribution which does not
qualify as a pro rata distribution, the foreign tax credit for the
group must be reduced to the extent necessary to make the overall
United States and foreign income taxes with respect to the distribu-
tion equal the overall United States and foreign taxes deemed paid
if the ninety per cent rule were applied.
For example, if corporation A receives dividends of seventy
dollars from corporation B, thirty dollars from corporation C, and
fifteen dollars from corporation D, the total distribution (115
dollars) would exceed the amount equal to the product of the statu-
tory percentage and the consolidated earnings and profits with
respect to corporation A (112.31 dollars), but corporation A must
make such a reduction in the foreign tax credit allowable that the
overall United States and foreign income taxes for the year with
respect to the distribution equal the overall United States and for-
eign taxes paid if the ninety per cent rule were applied-or 84.33
dollars. The computation would be as follows: [See Exhibit D]
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The 8.90 dollars of the foreign tax credit which was deferred
will be allocated to the remaining income of corporations B and
C in the ratio which the United States shareholder's proportionate
share of the remaining earnings and profits of each such corporation
for the taxable year bears to the United States shareholder's total
proportionate share of the combined earnings of corporation B and
corporation C for the year. If these earnings are distributed in sub-
sequent years, the proportionate amount of the foreign tax credit
which has been deferred will then be available.
CONCLUSION
Section 963 represents one of the most complex and ingenuous
concepts in the history of tax legislation. Originally intended as a
method of reducing the effect of the other sections of Subpart F, it
may prove to be a highroad to their complete avoidance. American
business will undoubtedly continue to expand internationally and
section 963 may become the most important single section of Sub-
part F for the United States corporate taxpayer with substantial
foreign holdings.
Although the problems anticipated are formidable enough, ap-
plication of these provisions to complex multicorporate relation-
ships spanning several national boundaries may create problems
undreamed of by the statutory draftsmen. The special rules con-
cerning treatment of the foreign tax credit superimpose further
problems on an area which was complicated enough at the outset,
and controversies will certainly arise in this area. As the provisions
are applied to complex multicorporate relationships clarification will
be required in some areas. Attempts to correlate the United States
tax system with those of other countries may create an administra-
tive nightmare. What is to be done in a situation involving a tax
system like Belgium's, for example, in which a percentage of the
tax paid on undistributed profits is refunded upon the distribution
of the profits in a subsequent year? 141 While the regulations sug-
gest that this would be proof of reasonable cause for a deficiency
distribution, it still creates further problems in the treatment of
the foreign tax credit, especially if the amount of the credit has
been reduced and the reduction deferred. At the very least it means
that, for an uncomfortably indefinite period, the taxpayer's returns
will be subject to the probability rather than the possibility of
change and recomputation.
141 Foreign Tax Law Association, 1965 Belgian Income Tax Service, art. 126.
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One particularly troublesome problem is the possibility of a
United States person who really has almost no control over the for-
eign corporation's activities but who qualifies as a United States
shareholder with respect to a controlled foreign corporation. The
provisions of Subpart F were aimed at the tax haven device, which
implies that the entity is dominated and under the control of the
United States shareholders. Their application to a United States
person who does not have such control appears to be a spurious
method of reaching a desired goal. 42 This is illustrated in the
examples given in the preceding material. Under the facts given,
domestic corporation A qualified as a United States shareholder
with respect to controlled foreign corporation F although it is quite
possible that corporation A had no voice in corporation F's affairs.
This would mean that corporation A would be forced to include a
proportional share of corporation F's Subpart F income in its gross
income even though it was against corporation A's best efforts that
the earnings remained undistributed. It would also mean that cor-
poration A would be effectively precluded from making an election
under section 963 unless corporation F should decide to make a
distribution which would qualify as a minimum distribution inde-
pendently of any efforts corporation A might make. Corporation A
could not force corporation F to make such a distribution.
Finally, the complexity of the provisions may result in their
being applied most frequently against taxpayers who believe that
they have effectively avoided Subpart F, resulting in uneven and
arbitrary enforcement. 43
Fredrick 0. Jolley
142 The concept of a controlling U.S. group is a keystone of this legislation
because without the U.S. group, potentially able to "control" or compel the
distribution of the "undistributed" earnings to be subject to tax to the
U.S. shareholders, the legislation as an income tax . . . would outrage
the traditional sense of fair play. Unfortunately, the U.S. group, although
meeting the legislative text [sic] of "control," might not, in fact, "control"
the foreign corporation in any practical sense.
McDonald, "Controlled Foreign Corporation," in 5 Institute on Private Investments.
Abroad 5, 9 (1963).
143 Id. at 8.
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